

Def Doc No. 1205

I N T Y E

United States of America etc.

- Versus -

AUKI, Sado etc.

SWORN

DEPOSITION

Deponent: M. A. U. K., Motero

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

Conce

D.D. 1223

Translated by  
Defence Language Branch

Affidavit (no.2)  
by  
Kotaro Nakamura

1. My name is Kotaro Nakamura.

2. My present address is:

No. 106, Imazato-chō, Shirokane, Shiba-ward, Tokyo.

3. I was born on August 28, 1881.

4. The outline of my career is as follows:

On Nov. 22, 1901 I graduated from the Military Academy (the 13th class)

On Dec. 3, 1909 I graduated from the Army Staff College.

On Dec. 22, 1930 I was appointed Chief of the Personnel Affairs Department of the War Ministry.

On April 11, 1932 I was promoted to Lieutenant General.

On March 1, 1937 I was appointed a War Councillor.

On June 23, 1938 I was promoted to General.

On July 15, 1938 I was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Korean Army.

On July 7, 1941 I was relieved of the position of the said Commander-in-Chief and appointed a War Councillor.

On Sept 30 of the same year I retired from the position.

5. I was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Korean Army on July 15, 1938.

I left Tokyo on the 17th of the same month for Seoul by plane and arrived there in the afternoon of the same day.

My predecessor was General KOISO (Kuniaki).

6. Prior to my appointment to this post, namely on July 11 while my predecessor KOISO was still Commander-in-Chief of the Korean Army, the first trespassing of the border by the Soviet Army occurred at Changkufeng near the Manchukuo-Soviet frontier. Our garrison guards at the front, however, waited patiently and on a strict watch hoping for an amicable

Def. No. # 1223

solution of the problem by diplomatic negotiations between Japan, Manchukuo and Russia. In view of the gravity of the situation, I visited the central army authorities on the 16th of the same month as soon as I was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Korean Army after having been relieved of my former position of a War Councillor, and heard the explanation about the situation from the officer in charge.

7. I could see from the foregoing that the central authorities had a policy to bring the matter to a rapid and amicable settlement through peaceful means. The central authorities instructed me accordingly, and I hurried for my new post as I said before.

8. When I arrived at Seoul, I found that an order from Tokyo dated July 16 had been waiting me there. The gist of the order was as follows:

"You are authorized to concentrate, if required, the forces under your command in Korea to the very border, in view of the Soviet army's unlawful trespassing near Changkufeng."

In compliance with this order I instructed a part of my forces to move, but restricted their movement to the west of the Tumen River in order to avoid to aggravate the situation.

9. At that time the 20th Division belonging to the Korean Army under my command was in action at the North China front and only the 19th Division (the divisional commander was Lieutenant-General SUETAKA, Kanezo) was staying at the peace time original position.

10. The said unit as well as the general situation in Korea showed nothing unusual and were quiet and peaceful.

11. This incident was also a concern to the Kwantung Army, because the

P D 1223

Changkufeng area was situated within the Manchukuo-Russian Border, in other words in Manchukuo. But viewed from the practical standpoint of the general topography, villages, communications etc., the district was most closely connected with the Korean Army and Korea. This was the reason why the Korean Army was made responsible for the guard duty at the border in this area and the frontier-guard of the 19th Division under my command was in charge of it.

12. The Korean Army strictly obeyed the instruction of the central authorities and was hoping for a settlement through diplomatic negotiations, but there was no prospect of immediate settlement.

13. Changkufeng is a hill, one hundred and several scores metres above the sea-level, but in the neighbourhood only small pine-trees or various kinds of shrubberies are growing here and there so that the bare hill, floating above them commanded a panoramic view of that district.

The railway line, connecting Manchukuo with Korea is only 6 miles. from the hill and can be seen clearly from there, while even Rashin "arbour, which is situated some 18 kilometres from there, is also within sight.

14. On July 20, the 19th Division tendered its opinion, to the Army head-quarter stating that it was its earnest desire to have a part of its frontier guard posted on a hill about 800 metres west of Changkufeng as it offered a nice position for the reconnoitering purposes. We, however, checked it by a telegram, fearing that an untoward incident which are apt to happen might touch off a real fighting thus aggravating unnecessarily the whole situation.

15. On July 23 a telegram was received from the army General Staff to the following effect:

D.D. 1223

"Diplomatic negotiations concerning the settlement of the Changjufeng Incident will be continued. The negotiations will be discontinued whenever the chance of success cease to exist, and the matter is now being considered along the line of evacuating the bulk of the forces, concentrated at the frontier-area to their original positions as soon as possible. You are requested to take sufficient care not to aggravate the trouble by careless mistakes." And on July 26 a telegram was received from the Imperial General Headquarters, in which we were ordered as follows:

"The Commander-in-Chief of the Korean Army is requested to order his troops concentrated in the area near the frontier to withdraw to their original positions. But, if required, a part of them may be used to strengthen the defence of the frontier."

16. On July 27 I ordered the troops of the 19th Divisions at the front (one infantry battalion at Chinghsin, the same unit at Kuchen, 2 infantry battalions and 2 artillery battalions at Awuchi and in the area west of it) to withdraw to their original positions in Ranan. Starting from the 28th of the same month the transportation of the troops were commenced from the Awuchi station by rail.

17. On July 29, at about 9.30 a.m. the Soviet Army advanced to a hill about 1,000 metres south of Shatsaofeng (it lies on the line about 350 metres west of the border-line between Hunchun and Kaiyakn) and began to fortify the hill. Consequently our guards in front of the hill were forced to repulse them and occupy the line since our patrol were fired upon by the Soviet machine-guns. But our troops withdrew immediately to their original position (about 1,000 meters west of the frontier line) in order to avoid further troubles. The Soviet army began, however, to attack

D.D 1223

us at about 4.30 p.m. and invaded the area about 500 metres across the frontier-line. Things having come to such a pass, our troops had no other way than to strengthen the forces at the front, in order to confront them. This new situation being obviously an outcome of a violation of the frontier-line, it is too serious a matter for the army to sit tight and let the matter take its own course. Thereupon, Lieut. General SUETAKA, the Divisional Commander of the 19th Division ordered a part of his troops (the bulk of the 75th Infantry Regiment) to withhold their movement and wait in the rear of the frontier guard as an emergency step in view of the rapid change of the situation.

I was of the opinion that the only solution was to repulse the Soviet troops outside of the Manchukuo territory. Therefore I approved the action on the part of the Division and issued an order at about 1.00 a.m. on July 30 to the following general effect:

"We must be satisfied if the Soviet army now attacking our troops stationed on the closed curve hill south-west of Shatsaofeng be repulsed from the Manchukuo territory, and in that event your troops are requested to withdraw to the above-mentioned closed curve line hill to keep watch on the Soviet Army's movements. But in order to avoid to aggravate the situation you must act carefully abstaining from attacking them if they have already withdrawn to the hill south of Shatsaofeng.

At the same time I made a report to the central authorities, the gist of which was as follows:

"This incident was caused by the unlawful trespassing of the border by arrogant Soviet Army in spite of the self-restraint exercised by our troops

D. D. 1223

at Chungkufeng, and was touched off by an unlawful challenge by the Soviet Army. Therefore I am convinced that this case must be settled separately from the Changkufeng Incident. I will manage to localize the matter, making it a fundamental principle to be satisfied if the Soviet Army confronting us is repulsed from the Manchukuo territory.

And further in the afternoon of the 30th I issued an order to the Division to the effect that it should not resort to arms unless specific orders to that effect are issued with the exception that it is free to do so in case of an attack by the enemy.

Then in the afternoon of the same day we received a telegram from the General Staff as follows:

"It is our policy to leave the handling of the Shatsaofeng Incident to the forces at the front, which are acting on the principle of non-aggrandizement."

In the same night another teleogramm came, which stated as follows:

"Regarding the incident of Shatsaofeng-chungkufeng area we have decided to leave the matter to local negotiations in order to avoid a further aggravation of the situation. You are to act along the following lines:

- (a) Our forces must abstain from any further activity unless challenged by the enemy.
- (b) Status Quo is to be maintained as to the Disposition and action of our forces for the present except be ready for the enemy's counter-attack. Our actions are to be guided by utmost prudence.

18. Our troops at the front occupied before dawn of the 30th several hills about 800 to 900 metres from the enemy position at Shatsaofeng and Changkufeng, under a camouflage and kept a strict watch on the enemy action.

TD. 1223

But about 1:40 a.m. on the 31st the Soviet Army started to advance, in spite of the pitch darkness, accompanied by tanks and under cover of bombardments. Our troops responded to this at once and successfully repulsing completely occupied by 6:00 a.m. on the 31st, all the Russian fortresses in the area between Changkufeng and Shatsaofeng in Manchukuo territory, and Shatsaofeng. Our troops, however, remained within the border-line and strictly observed non-aggrandizement policy.

19. In the afternoon of August 1 we received a telegraphic order from the Imperial General Headquarters as follows:

"Your forces shall keep the existing position in the Changkufeng and Shatsaofeng area for the present and keep a strict watch on the Manchukuo-Soviet Border facing your forces. And another to the following effect:

1. Your forces shall refrain from expanding actions in the Chungkufeng and Shatsaofeng area, as long as the Soviet forces do not challenge us. The Disposition and action of the forces must be maintained status quo except, to be ready for the enemy's counter-attack.
2. As to the Manchukuo-Soviet border district facing our troops besides the said area you must keep it in mind not to irritate the enemy by our action, although a strict watch for them should be specifically required.
3. You must exercise the utmost care with regard to the activities of your forces in general.

At the same time the following telegram reached me from the War Ministry:

"Non-aggrandizement policy is still to be followed. We are going to refer the matter instantly to diplomatic negotiations in order to settle

D.D. 1023

it rapidly as a local question, viewed in the light of justice and propriety and for the sake of peace."

20. Our Korean Army observed the afore-going order faithfully and sticking to the non-aggrandizement policy, exercised the greatest care with regard to its own action.

21. In spite of this the Soviet Army continued to increase their forces from the rear positions day by day and made a heavy attack on our troops. We only defended the border-line with stubborn resoluteness in a purely passive way.

22. Since August 1 the Soviet Army began to bomb our front line directly using about 2 Brigades of Air forces. At the same time the North Korea Railway-line, the Tumen River-bridge and several places in Korea were attacked. As the result our casualties at the front mounted and the people's feeling in the North Korea was disturbed day after day.

Such being the case, I suggested to the central authorities to use our own Air forces limiting their sphere of action within our territory. It was not accepted, so none of our planes appeared at the front throughout the period.

23. The Russian artillery forces had more than 90 guns. As the result of their steady bombardment the repeated raids on us with some 100 tanks and the bombing by planes our casualties at the front were calculated to amount to 200 on the average per day around the period of August 9 and the strength of the 19th Division (under peace-time organization) was quite exhausted.

24. As explained before the non-aggrandizement policy, was, however,

D.D. 1223

a strict order from the central headquarters of command. The Korean Army obeyed this policy faithfully to the last in spite of the difficulties and disadvantages suffered by our troops at the front in strategy as well as in command.

I am of the opinion that once the enemy is defeated it is most advisable to pursue it without losing time to assure that it will not regain power. Our troops at the front near Changkufeng, however, could not pursue the enemy in spite of their gain and remained in the same position (within the border-line) as before as they were obeying the non-aggrandizement policy. Consequently, the Soviet Army made continuous counter attacks on us from every directions quite obstinately ever increasing their strength so that our casualties at the front increased very much and our position was very difficult.

25. The Divisional Commander of the 19th Division suggested that he might be allowed to use all the troops of the Division at his liberty, in view of the difficult situation at the front and our mounting casualties. In spite of my sympathy I did not accede to his request throughout the period fearing that he might go over the limit of the non-aggrandizement policy unawares, if a superior force were placed under his command.

26. Our Changkufeng-front area was divided by the big Tumen River. The front nearest to the enemy was so narrow in its configuration that the troops could barely cover themselves. I thought it unadvisable to repeat frontal battles in the Changkufeng-Shatsaofeng area if we want to settle the matter rapidly. I was of the opinion that we better settle the matter once for all by a flank attack on the right side of the Soviet Army's

D.D 1923

back starting from the upper stream of the Tumen River on the opposite bank of Chinghsing. And I consulted with the central authorities about the foregoing plan. But I could not succeed to get their approval because of the non-aggrandizement policy.

27. The only way to settle the matter rapidly and locally was to make the Soviet Army give up their intension of the trespassing the border. In order to attain this objective we had many plans, but they were not approved as I explained above, because of the fear of going over the limit of the non-aggrandizement policy.

Such being the case, our Army, especially the troop at the front had to adopt a passive attitude, the most unadvisable in battles, enduring unfavorable conditions of every description, in order to do their best to settle the matter locally. In other words, our troops at the front never initiated an attack on the Soviet Army. On the contrary, they always acted defensively and did not act outside the area where the enemy attack commenced never pursuing it over the border-line. All this was done in order to avoid the expansion of the battle zone and the loosening of the application of the non-aggrandizement policy. They did their best in order to fracture the Soviet Army's intention limiting their activities within the local district.

28. About August 8 the strength of the enemy at the front was estimated to be 3 divisions of sharp-shooters, one cavalry division, one tanks brigade and 2 air force brigades. To cope with this enemy we fought only with the strength of the 19th Division, deploying in a wide field. Our infantry unit at the front had only three thousands men.

29. And in the midst of the hard battle the truce-agreement was concluded  
~~that no more no fewer than both forces were ordered to cease fighting,~~

Def Doc No. 1225

On this 28th day of December, 1947  
at TOKYO.

DEPONENT NAKAMURA, Kotaro (seal)

I, BANNO, Junkichi hereby certify that the above statement  
was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal  
thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date  
at same place.

Witness: (signed) BANNO, JUNKICHI (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole  
truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

NAKAMURA, Sadeo (seal)

- 77 -  
- 12 -

板東國際宣傳裁判所

亞米利加合衆國其他

對

荒木貞夫 其他

宣誓供述書（其ノ二）

供述者

中村孝太郎

自分儀我團ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ヅ別紙ノ通り宣誓ヲ爲シタル上次

ノ如ク供述致シマス

DD 1223

表

DD 1223  
一 私ノ姓名ハ中村孝太郎デアリマス  
二 私ノ現住所ハ東京都芝區白金今里町一〇六番地デアリマス  
三 私ノ生年月日ハ明治十四年（一八八一年）八月二十八日デアリマス  
四 私ノ経歴ノ概要ハ次ノ通りデアリマス  
明治三十四年（一九〇一年）十一月二十二日 陸軍士官學校卒業（第十三期生）  
同 四十二年（一九〇九年）十二月三日 陸軍大學校卒業  
昭和 五年（一九三〇年）十二月二十二日 陸軍省人事局長  
同 七年（一九三一年）四月十一日 陸軍中將  
同 十二年（一九三七年）三月一日 軍事參議官  
同 十三年（一九三八年）六月二十三日 陸軍大將  
同 十三年（一九三八年）七月十五日 朝鮮軍司令官ニ親補  
同 十六年（一九四一年）七月七日 朝鮮軍司令官ヲ罷メ軍事參議官ニ轉補  
同 年 九月三十日 退職  
五 私ハ昭和十三年（一九三八年）七月十五日朝鮮軍司令官ニ補セラレ 同月十七日東京出發飛行機ニテ同日午後任地京城ニ到着シマシタ  
前任者ハ小磯國昭大將デアリマシタ

六 石ノ發令前即チ前任者小磯朝鮮軍司令官ノ時代ノ七月十一日「ソ」<sup>清國</sup>  
境張鼓峰附近ニ於テ「ソ」<sup>韓兵</sup>ノ越境工事開始問題惹起シ我等一線守備  
隊ハ隠忍自重之ヲ監視シツ、日清「ソ」問ニ於テ外交交渉ニヨリ之ヲ打  
開セントシテ居タノデアリマス、私ハ前職軍事參議官ヨリ朝鮮軍司令官  
前任ノ大命ヲ受ケルヤ右ノ情勢ニ鑑ミ同月十六日陸軍中央部ニ出頭シ一  
應ノ事情ヲ聽取シマシタ

七 私ハ石ニ依リ中央部ハ事件ヲ平和的ニ解決スル方針ヲ以テ外交交渉ニ移  
シ之カ速ナル圓滑解決ニ努ムルモノナルコトヲ知リ且其ノ旨中央部ヨリ  
指示ヲ受ケ前述ノ如ク急遽赴任シタノデアリマス

八 前述ノ如ク京城ニ着任シテ見マスト七月十六日附ヲ以テ中央ヨリ次ノ趣  
旨ノ命令カ來テ居リマシタ「即チ張鼓峰附近「ソ」軍ノ不法越境ニ對シ  
所要ニ應シ在鮮ノ隸下部隊ヲ國境近クニ采中スルコトヲ得」ト  
私ハ石命令ニ基キ一部兵力ノ推進ヲ行ヒマシタカ絶對ニ爭態ノ擴大ヲ避  
ケル爲豆満江以西ニ止メタノデアリマス

九 當時朝鮮軍ノ執下部隊中第二十師團ハ北又ニ出動シ第十九師團（師團長

六 石ノ發令前即チ前任者小磯朝鮮軍司令官ノ時代ノ七月十一日「ソ」朝國境張鼓峰附近ニ於テ「ソ」聯兵ノ越境工事開始問題惹起シ我等一線守備隊ハ隣忍自重之ヲ監視シツ、日浦「ソ」間ニ於テ外交交渉ニヨリ之ヲ打開セントシテ居タノデアリマス、私ハ前職軍事參議官ヨリ朝鮮軍司令官前任ノ大命ヲ受ケルヤ右ノ情勢ニ鑑ミ同月十六日陸軍中央部ニ出頭シ一應ノ事情ヲ聽取シマンシタ

七 私ハ石ニ依リ中央部ハ事件ヲ平和的ニ解決スル万針ヲ以テ外交交渉ニ移シ之カ速ナル圓滑解決ニ努ムルモノナルコトヲ知リ且其ノ旨中央部ヨリ指示ヲ受ケ前述ノ如ク急遽赴任シタノデアリマス

八 前述ノ如ク京城ニ着任シテ見マスト七月十六日附ヲ以テ中央ヨリ次ノ趣旨ノ命令カ來テ居リマシタ「即チ張鼓峰附近「ソ」軍ノ不法越境ニ對シ所要ニ應シ在鮮ノ隸下部隊ヲ國境近クニ集中スルコトヲ得」ト  
私ハ右命令ニ基キ一部兵力ノ推進ヲ行ヒマシタカ絶對ニ事態ノ擴大ヲ避ケル爲豆満江以西ニ止メタノデアリマス

九 當時朝鮮軍ノ執下部隊中第二十師團ハ北文ニ出動シ第十九師團（師團長

尾高龜藏中將一ノミ固有ノ勘成地ニ位置シ平時狀態ニ在リマシタ

廿、右ノ我部隊及朝鮮内ノ状況、河津ノ變化ハク平靜デアリマス。

十一張鼓峰附近ハ清「ソ」國境線内即テ清洲國内デアツテ本事件ハ關東軍ニ  
關係スル所テモアリマスカ一般ノ地形村落、交通等ノ狀態ハ明瞭算及朝

ト開保城モ密接テアリマスノデ此ノ地方國境線ノ警備ハ朝鮮軍

十六前述ノ中央ノ方針ヲ朝鮮軍ハ既ニ遵奉シ外交交渉ニ依ル事件解決ヲ待望シマシタカ茲再日ヲ経過スルノミテ外交交渉成立ノ見込ハ立チマセンデ

十三 張鼓峰ハ標高百数十米ノ小丘陵テアルカ附近ハ小松ヤ種々ノ灌木カ所々ニ點生スルダケテアルカラ赤堯ノ丘陵ノミガクツキリト浮ヒ上ツテ居テ非常ニ長ク展望ノキク地盤ニアリマシタ。此處カラハ浦群ヲ結ブ我方鐵道線モ僅カ六糺余ノ彼方ニ手ニ取ル様ニ見エル許リカ十八糺余ヲ隔テタ羅津港迄モ一眸ノ裡ニ指顧シ得ルト云フ屬強ナ高地デアツタノデアリマス

十四處テ七月二十日第十九師團ヨリ張鼓峰西側約八〇〇米ノ高地ハ偵察ニ好

D.D. 1223

適デアルカラ是非トモ國境守備隊ノ一部ヲ此處へ進メタイトノ意見具申  
フシテ來タコトガアリマスカ朝鮮軍トシテハ不慮ノ事態發生ノ虞アルヲ  
顧慮シスル行動ハ動モスレハ戰爭惹起ノ端緒トナリ全般ニ波及スル虞大  
ナルモノガアルカラ見合セルヨウニト電報ヲ以テ抑止シマシタ

玄次テ七月二十三日諺諺本部ヨリ「張鼓峰事件今後ノ處理ニ關シテハ外交  
接觸ハ依然促進スルモ成功ノ見込ガナイトキハ之ヲ打切り先ニ國境方面  
ニ集中シタ部隊ノ主力ハ成ルヘク遠カニ舊狀ニ復歸セシメル方針テ達メ  
ラレアリ、今後共不用意ナ紛争ノ擴大ヲ防止スル爲十分ナル福澤ヲスル  
ヨウ」ニトノ旨ノ電報カ來又七月二十六日大本營命令トシテ「朝鮮軍司  
令官ハ國境ニ近ク集中シタ部隊ヲ適宜原狀地ニ歸還セシメヨ 所要ニ應  
シ一部ヲ以テ國境警備ヲ強化セヨ」トノ旨ノ電報カ來マシタ

夫其處テ私ハ七月二十七日第十九師團出動兵力（歩兵一大隊ヲ）與歩兵一  
大隊ヲ古城歩兵ニ大隊及砲兵ニ大隊ヲ阿吾地及其西方ニ出動一ヲ原狀地  
置向ニ歸還ノ命令ヲ發シ諸隊ハ二十八日以降阿吾地還カラ鐵道輸送ヲ開  
始シマシタ

古處カ七月二十九日午前九時三十分頃「ソ」聯兵ハ沙草峰南方約一〇〇〇

DD 1223

米ノ高地（珲春界約ノ國境線上ヨリ西方約三五〇米ノ線）ニ進出シテ來リ工事ヲ始メマシタカラ其ノ正面ニ居タ我國境守備隊ハ止ムナク之ヲ駆逐シテ其ノ線ヲ占領シマシタカ飽ク迄前後ノ紛糾ヲ避ケル爲再ヒ守備位置（國境線上ヨリ約一〇〇米西方）ニ後退復歸シマシタ然ルニ午後四時三十分頃「ソ」聯部隊ハ更ニ攻撃シテ來テ國境線上ヨリ約五〇〇米モ侵入シマシタ是ニ於テ我方モ已ムナク第一線ノ兵力ヲ增加シ之ト相對峙スルニ至リマシタ此ノ新事態ハ明カニ國境線蹂躪デアツテ草ノ責務上此ノ處ノ推移ニ委シ置ケナイ重大事デアリマス其處テ第十九師團長尾高中將ハ狀況ノ急變ヲ顧慮シ一部兵力（歩兵第七十五聯隊主力）ノ歸還輸送ヲ中止シ之ヲ國境守備隊ノ後方ニ待機セシムルコト、シマシタ私ハ「ソ」聯部隊ノ不法越境ハ之ヲ滿領外ニ擊退スル以外ニナシトシ右師團ノ行動ヲ是認シ且七月三十日午前一時頃纔ネ次ノ如ク師團ニ指示シマシタ

「沙草峰西南閉鎖曲線高地ノ我軍部隊ヲ攻撃中」「ソ」軍ヲ擊退シ滿領外ニ驅逐スルヲ以テ滿足シ當分前記閉鎖曲線高地ニ後退シテ監視スルヲ要スヘキモ彼若シ既ニ沙草峰南側高地ニ後退シアル場合ハ敢テ之ヲ攻撃セス以テ事件ヲ擴大セサル如ク慎重ニ處理セシコトヲ望ム」

D.D. 1223

同時ニ中央部ニ對シ概ネ次ノ如ク報告シマシタ  
「本事件ハ我力軍カ張鼓峰ニ於テハ隱忍自重セルニ拘ハラス圖ニ乘ツタ」  
ソ直ノ不法越境ニ端ヲ發シ次テ其ノ不法挑戦ニ依リ生起シタモノノデアル  
カラ張鼓峰事件トハ別圖ニ處理セラルヘキモノト確信スル而シテ現對峙中  
ノ「ソ」軍ヲ滿領外ニ撤退スルヲ以テ滿足スルヲ本旨トシ事件ヲ他ニ波及  
セシメナイ様ニ指導ス」

更ニ三十日午後師團ニ對シ「敵ノ攻撃ヲ受ケナイ限り實力行使ハ別命ニ依  
ルヘキ」旨ヲ命令シマシタ

又同日午後總隊一部カラハ「沙草峰事件ハ差當リ不擴大方針ヲ堅持シテ實  
施シツ、アリモ部隊ノ處理ニ委スル方針ニテ進ミツツアル」旨ノ電報、  
次テ同日夜沙草峰、張鼓峰附近事件ニ關シ中央ハ現況以上ニ擴大セサル  
方針ヲ以テ局地的商議ニ移スコト、ナツカ直ノ行動ハ差當リ左記ニ依リ  
處置セラレ度

イ敵ノ挑戦シナイ限り我ノ行動ヲ現在以上ニ發展セシメス  
口直ノ配備及行動、敵ノ反撃ニ對シ準備スルノ外暫ク現狀ノ儘トシ其ノ行

DD 1223

動ハ之ヲ慎重ニス」旨ノ電報カ來マシタ

十八 我カ第一線部隊ハ三十日未明迄ニ沙草峰及張鼓峰ノ敵前既ネ八、九百米ノ諸高地ヲ隠蔽シテ占領シ嚴ニ「ソ」聯側ノ行動ヲ監視警戒シマシタ然ルニ三十一日午前一時四十分頃「ソ」軍ハ暗夜ニモ拘ラス戰車ヲ伴ヒ且正確ナル支援砲撃ヲ以テ攻撃前進シ來マシタカラ我軍ハ直ニ之ニ應戦シテ反撃シ三十一日午前六時頃迄ニ敵ヲ擊退シテ張鼓峰及沙草峰ト張鼓峰トノ中間清領ノ各「ソ」軍陣地竝ニ沙草峰ヲ何レモ完全ニ占領シマシタ然シ我軍ハ依然國境線内ニ留マリ事件不擴大方針ヲ勝守シテ居タノデアリマス

十九 八月一日午後大本營カラ「朝鮮宣司令官ハ當分ノ間張鼓峰、沙草峰附近概不現達出線附近ヲ占據シ且石以外宜正面ノ清「ソ」廻境ノ警戒ヲ嚴ナラシメヨ」トノ旨ノ命令ト共ニ「『張鼓峰沙草峰附近ニ於テ』『ソ』宣ノ挑戦ナキ限り直率行動ヲ現在以上ニ進展セシムルナ宣ノ配置及行動ハ敵ノ反撃ニ對シ準備スル以外ハ現状ヲ維持セヨニ右以外宜正面ノ清「ソ」廻境方面ニ於テハ特ニ警戒ヲ嚴ナラシムルモ實際ノ行動ハ微ヲ刺激シナイコトニ留意セヨ

DD 1223

- 三、宣ノ行動ハ全般ニ亘リ慎重ナラシムヘシ」トノ旨ノ指示電報カ來、同  
時ニ陸軍省ヨリハ本一件ニ於テハ不擴大方針ヲ堅持スルコト從前ト異ナ  
ルコトナク公正妥當且平和的見地ニ立チ局地問題トシテ敏速ニ之力解決  
ヲ期スル爲件ヲ速力ニ外交商議ニ移ス方針ナル」旨ノ電報カ來マシタ  
二十、朝鮮直ハ石ノ命令指示ノ通りニ處置シ只管事件ノ不擴大方針ヲ堅持  
シ慎重ヲ期シタノテアリマス  
二十一、然ルニ「ソ」直ハ爾後連日續々後方ヨリ兵力ヲ注入シ猛烈ナル攻  
撃ヲ加ヘ更マシタカ我方ハ全然受身ノ状態ヲ以テ國境線ヲ頑守スル外何  
等ノ行動ニ拘ツル事ヲ爲シマセンデシタ  
二十二、八月一日以降「ソ」軍ハ約二ヶ飛行旅團ヲ以テ直接受我カ第一線ヲ  
爆破スル爲詳鐵道、豆溝江橋梁、鮮内各地ニ攻撃ヲ加ヘテ來テ第一線  
ノ損害、北朝鮮民心ノ動搖ハ逐次増大シマシタ  
其處テ私ハ我飛行部隊ノ我領内ニ限定スル出動方ニツキ中央ニ意見ヲ内  
申シマシタカ認可セラレス最後迄飛行機ハ一機モ出動セシメルコトハア  
リマセンテシタ  
二十三、「ソ」軍砲兵ハ九〇門ヲ下ラス其ノ間折ナキ射撃ト百台余ノ戰車

D.D. 1223

ヲ伴フ反復攻撃及飛行機ノ燃耗ノ爲我第一線ノ損害ハ八月九日頃毎日平均二〇〇名ニ達シ第十九師團（平時偏制）兵力ハ涸渴スルニ至リマシタ二十四然シ乍ラ事件不擴大方針ハ前述ノ如ク中央統帥部ノ嚴命スル所テアツテ朝鮮宣亦之ヲ堅持シ第一線各部隊ハ指揮統率及戰況等ニ於テ著シ

ク苦境ニ立チツツモ威トシテ克ク此ノ方針ヲ確守シマシタ

思ヒマスノニ戰鬪ニ於テハ一旦敵ヲ擊破シタナラバ之ヲ急追シテ再ヒ立ツ能ハサラシムルヲ以テ最良ノ手段トスルノテアリマス然ルニ張鼓峰附近ノ我第一線部隊ハ不擴大方針ヲ堅持スル爲メ敵ヲ擊碎シツツモ之ヲ追撲スルコトナク依然同一地（國境線内）ニ留マツテ對戦シテ居マス故

「ソ」宜ハ新兵力ヲ増加シテ各方面ヨリ絶ヘス執拗ニ我ニ反攻ヲ加ヘ來テ我一線ノ死傷増大シ苦戦最モ大ナルモノカアリマシタ

二十五 第十九師團長ハ第一線ノ戰況ト損害甚大ナルヲ顧慮シ重ニ對シテ師團全部隊ノ速力ナル掌握使用ヲ内申シテ來マシタカ宣ハ師團長カ優勢ナル兵力ヲ掌握セハ不知不識不擴大方針ノ範圍ヲ逸脱スル處ナシトシナルイノヲ顧慮シ師團ノ苦戦苦境ヲ万察シツツ涙ヲ呑ンデ最後迄其ノ意見ヲ容レマセンデシタ

D.D. 1223

二十六

張鼓峰附近我第一線方面ノ地形ハ豆滿江ノ大河ニヨリ分断セラレ  
最前線方面ハ地形狹長デアツテ部隊ノ遮蔽行動煩ル困難デアリマシタ  
夫レ故張鼓峰沙草峰方面ノミニ於テ正面攻防ヲ繕リ返スノハ事件ノ解決  
ヲ急速ナラシメル所以デアリマセンノデ正面ト共ニ慶興對岸豆滿江上流  
左岸ノ地區カラ「ソ」軍ノ右側背ニ兵力ヲ使用シ一舉ニ事件ノ解決ヲ計  
ルヲ可ナリト判断シ私ハ之ヲ中央當局ニ謀リマシタカ之モ不塘大方針ノ  
爲承認セラレルニ至リマセンデシタ

二十七

宣トシテ現地ニ於テ事件ヲ急速ニ解決セシムル方法ハ一ニ「ソ」  
聯側ノ越境企圖ヲ斷念セシムルニ在ツテ之カ爲ニ採ルヘキ方法手段ハ種  
々アリト雖モ悉ク事件不擅方針ノ逸脱ヲ顧慮シ之カ採用ヲ承認セラレナ  
カツタコトハ前述ノ通りデアリマス

茲ニ於テ宣及第一線各部隊ハ一意當面スル地域ニ於テ凡百ノ惡事件ニ耐  
ヘ陰忍自重終始威嚇ニ於テ最モ避クヘキ受動的行動ニ甘ンジ現地解決ニ  
全力ヲ傾注シタノデアリマス  
即チ我第一線部隊ハ自ラ進ンデ「ソ」軍ヲ攻撃シタルハ絶無デアツテ常  
ニ「ソ」軍ノ進攻ニ對應シテ之ヲ擊破シ而カモ「ソ」軍ノ進攻正而以外

ノ 地 區 ニ 行 動 スルコトナク且國境線外ニ追撃セス以テ 戰闘及戰闘地域ノ  
擴大、延テハ事件不擴大方針ノ弛緩ヲ嚴戒シ極力當面スル現地ニ於テ「  
ソ」聯軍側ノ企圖ヲ破碎抑止スルニ努メタノデアリマス

二十八 八月八日頃一ソ一軍當四ノ兵力ハ狙撃師團三ヶ師團 賦兵一ヶ師  
團 戰車一旅團 飛行機二ヶ旅團ト判断セラレタルニ對シ我方ハ終始第  
十九師團ノ兵力ノミタ以テ對戦シ廣正面ニ展開シ其ノ属一泊歩兵ハ三千  
名余ニ渦キマゼンデシタ

二十九 斯クシテ苦戦中ニ外交折衝中ノ停戦協定カ成立シ八月十一日正午  
彼我戦闘行爲停止ヲ命シタノデアリマス

昭和二十一年（一九四六年）十二月二十二日於東京

右ハ當立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シマス

供述者 中村孝太郎

同日於同所

立會人

阪少

埜

淳

吉

10 1223

誓フ 良心ニ從ヒ眞實ヲ述べ何事ヲモ狀秘セズ又何事ヲモ附加セザルコトヲ

宣

誓

書

(捺署  
印名)

中  
村  
孝  
太  
郎